In the aftermath of the Arab awakening, Islamic parties have swept the electoral landscape in parts of the Arab Middle East. While these movements rule out the strict implementation of shari'a, they have nonetheless supported the inclusion of Islamic principles in legislation and social life (Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottoway 2006: 9-10) . At the same time, however, Islamic parties of the Arab world have eagerly promoted civil and political liberties in their platforms.
Similarly, ordinary citizens appear to be reconciling their attitudes regarding Islamic and democratic forms of governance. Most Muslims have been shown to be highly supportive of both democracy and shari'a (Esposito and Mogahed 2007) . The Arab World is no exception as scholars have found that Arab citizens simultaneously hold favorable orientations toward Islamic and democratic forms of government (Jamal 2006; Jamal and Tessler 2008) . These empirical facts stand in sharp contrast to the theoretical debate concerning the incompatibility of Islam and democracy (Kedourie 1992; Huntington 1996) . This is the starting point of the current study:
What explains individual support for democracy and shari'a 1 in the Arab World?
A growing research literature finds that factors associated with modernization and social capital explain much of the variation in Muslim support for democracy (Tessler 2002; Bratton 2003; Jamal 2006; Ciftci 2010) . Our understanding of the microlevel determinants of support for shari'a, however, is meager. Scholars have yet to understand whether the same or different factors explain favorable views toward democracy and shari'a. In this paper, I argue that values related to the historically rooted secular-Islamist cleavage are likely to inform individual opinion about these governing principles in Arab polities. Two different explanatory logics are employed. First, it is argued that secular-Islamist values generate diametrically opposed effects on support for democracy and shari'a due to a traditional Islamist ideology. Second, the impact of these values is proposed to be congruent on individual support toward both objects thanks to a modernist Islamist position. In the paper, I also argue that these rival hypotheses are conditioned by the highly-diverse contextual effects in Arab polities stemming from state-religion relations and the history of democracy. I test the implications of this value-based approach and compare its explanatory power to the alternative explanations of modernization and social capital.
I focus on the Arab world for several reasons. First, this analysis sheds light on the preferences of individuals forming the support base for Islamist parties in these countries.
Second, the implementation of shari'a is a crucial component of constitutional theory in the Muslim World where its relevance is recently increasing with the drafting of new constitutions and the amendment of old ones. Hence, investigating the choices of citizens about shari'a and democracy will demonstrate the extent of popular support for constitutional models combining the two governing principles (e.g. democratized shari'a (Feldman 2008) . Third, the democracy gap remains a reality in the Arab Gulf countries which have shari'a based political systems.
Thus, this analysis may also provide insights about the microlevel foundations of support for shari'a and democracy in these authoritarian settings.
I use survey data from the first wave of the Arab Barometer surveys and run a series of pooled bivariate probit and country level probit estimations for empirical analysis. The results
show that Islamist and non-secularist values are highly relevant in explaining the individual orientations toward democracy and shari'a in the Arab World. Arab citizens holding nonsecularist values are less supportive of democracy and more supportive of shari'a. However, the effects of Islamic values on support for these objects are, by and large, complementary. Since the Arab street favors both democracy and shari'a, this may be indicative of popular support toward constitutional models that combine principles of Islamic governance and democracy.
Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World
The literature about the determinants of individual support for democracy in the Muslim World may be helpful in explaining support for shari'a. This literature can be classified in three groups.
The first group of studies use modernization theory as a predictor of opinion (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . They find that the high levels of education and income are significant determinants of Muslim attitudes toward democracy (Jamal 2006; Bratton 2003 ).
In the same vein, a different approach elaborates on the cultural implications of modernization theory and argues that egalitarian gender views predict support for democracy in the Arab countries and throughout the Muslim world (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Ciftci 2010) .
A second group of studies utilize the implications of civic culture and social capital theories to explain support for democracy among Muslims. According to these theories, social trust is crucial for the development of democratic values by providing a basis for cooperation among the members of a society (Putnam 1993) . While most Arab citizens lack the necessary means for the development of such values, they may be able to find venues for participation and develop an alternative civic culture even within authoritarian settings (Singerman 1996) . For example, Jamal (2007a, b) finds that in the Arab Middle East, higher levels of social trust are associated with support for the existing regime; hence, lower levels of trust may be more conducive to democracy.
A third group of studies focus on religiosity to explain support for democracy. An impressive body of literature has concluded that being a devout Muslim is not necessarily incompatible with democratic values and that higher levels of religiosity may not generate negative views of democracy (Tessler 2002; Bratton 2003; Hoffman 2004; Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Hassan 2008; Jamal 2006; Ciftci 2010 (Feldman 2008) . From the onset of the modernization process in the Muslim world, shari'a and democracy were parts of the same question. Therefore, the analysis of individual attitudes toward democracy will be incomplete without modeling support for shari'a.
Shari'a and the Secular-Islamist Cleavage
Historical legacies matter and they create path-dependent trajectories that transform culture and values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) . Some scholars argue that the historically-rooted secularIslamist cleavage penetrates into almost all political issues and actions in the Muslim world (Roy 1994; Hunter 1995) . The same cleavage may also serve as a potent source of value generation and shape individual attitudes.
The history of shari'a implementation provides insights for understanding the emergence of a secular-Islamist cleavage. During the Middle Ages, Muslims accepted the rule of the despots only to avoid fitna (i.e. anarchy) and as long as shari'a served as a legal principle limiting the power of the ruler (Feldman 2008) . This balance led to the idealization of a model known as the "medieval compromise" (Filali-Ansary 2003) . This model, however, came into question during the Western colonial period. The polarization between the colonial powers and the locals in the Muslim world led to a false impression that Islam is a religion hostile to modern institutions (Ayoob 2007; Filali-Ansary 2003) . One dimension of this polarization was most imminently seen in the codification of the Western-style code replacing the shari'a law (Brown 1997; Feldman 2008; Hefner 2011) .
Early implementations of modern code did not create fierce opposition as it left the shari'a-based institutions untouched (Brown 1997 ), but they paved the way for a future clash.
What started as an early confrontation between the two civilizations led to the different schools of thought being embedded in the various forms of elitist and popular revivalist movements (Feldman 2008; Hunter 1998; Zubaida 1993; Anderson 1987; Owen 2004; Ibrahim 1980 shari'a and pluralist institutions (Ramadan 2009: 148) .
Beyond these theoretical debates, public opinion polls demonstrate that, by and large, incorporated Islamist actors into a governing coalition. From these divergent examples, it seems reasonable to anticipate that the relationship between Islamic values and democracy/shari'a will be conditioned by these contextual factors. Individuals may have convergent or divergent attitudes toward these two objects depending on the context. I created two variables from the surveys to explore the contextual differences in attitudes toward democracy and shari'a in the Arab world. The first is support for democracy and is constructed using the questions regarding level of agreement with the following statements:
In a democracy, the economy runs badly shari'a in their empirical analysis (Davis and Robinson 2006; Moaddel 2007) . Figure 1 tabulates the distribution of responses to these items in each country.
Figure 1 Here
As shown in Figure 1 , there is a certain degree of overlap between attitudes toward democracy and shari'a, but in some cases the opinions remain divergent. In most countries, at least 40% of the respondents support both shari'a and democracy. Not surprisingly, the zeroorder correlation between the two variables is positive (.0031), but not statistically significant. Figure 1 shows a certain degree of overlap between the favorable views toward these notions. Thus, it becomes imperative to control for the dependency between the individual determinants of shari'a and democracy. To that end, the bivariate probit model has been employed. In this technique, probit models are run simultaneously to determine whether they are dependent by assessing the correlation of the error terms. If there is a statistically significant correlation between the error terms of the two equations, the models are dependent.
When dependency is observed, it is methodologically more appropriate to run both equations simultaneously. In the pooled model presented below, the significant likelihood ratio test shows that decisions to support shari'a and democracy are dependent, justifying the use of bivariate probit. In specific country models, however, bivariate probit is mostly not justified. Thus, I use probit estimation for country level models. It should be noted that the results are the same in both estimation techniques.
Independent Variables
The dependent variables are support for democracy and support for shari'a (introduced above).
To The models also include religiosity, age, and gender as control variables. The effects associated with these variables may take positive or negative signs with respect to support for shari'a and they may not be diametrically opposed to the effects of these indicators on democratic support.
Appendix A provides a detailed description of the control variables.
Results Table 1 reports the results from the pooled models. Since the list-wise deletion drops a large number of observations, I ran the estimations by including DK responses as middle categories.
Both dependent variables range between 1 and 5 with the addition of these responses. However, the dichotomous variable measuring support for democracy includes additional middle category responses, because it is a combination of four items. Since support for shari'a is measured by a single item, it lacks these additional responses and it is constructed by a mid-point split (1-2/3-4).
This discrepancy can pose a threat to the validity of the analysis presented below. To account for this difference, in Model 1, I dropped the additional middle category responses in constructing 'support for democracy' and estimated the models with dependent variables which are parallel in construction. 5 In both models, the LR test of Rho is statistically significant justifying the use of However, individuals favoring the installment of Islamic principles in economic affairs are able to reconcile their attitudes toward both governing principles. (Jamal 2006; Ciftci 2010 ).
To demonstrate the substantive impact of each indicator on the joint support for shari'a and democracy, I calculated the marginal effects. These effects, shown in Figure 2 , represent the rate of change generated by each covariate for the different combinations of the two dependent variables when all other variables are held constant. I present four sets of statistically significant marginal effects: the likelihood of support for democracy given support for shari'a, the likelihood of support for shari'a given support for democracy, the support for shari'a in the lack of support for democracy, and the support for democracy in the lack of support for shari'a. Table 2 Here
According to the results in Table 2 The results in Table 2 The country level analysis demonstrates that, notwithstanding these general patterns, more needs to be explained in order to unfold the subtle contextual differences. Particularly, scholars need to examine the distinct attitudinal patterns about governing principles in countries where Islam is incorporated into the regime through semi-democratic institutions (i.e. Jordan and Morocco).
In addition to the effects of Islamic and secularist values, one indicator of cultural modernization theory, perceptions of gender equality, powerfully predicts and delineates the citizens' views about democracy and shari'a. The gender dynamic is also relevant to the extent that women are found to be less supportive of democracy and more supportive of shari'a. Past studies argued that the lack of democracy in the Muslim world is related to the status of women (Fish 2002) . While no conclusive evidence is provided to determine whether the disadvantaged status of women is due to Islam (which would be a doubtful claim given the revolutionary discourse of Islam about women's rights (Mernissi 1996) ) or due to a patrimonial culture, the results of the analysis show that, in the realm of attitudes, gender and the perception of gender equality powerfully predict support for democracy and shari'a. Whether this can be generalized to the Muslim world or is unique to the Arab Middle East should be investigated in future 1 Literally, shari'a means "the path to water" or "the path to God" and "shari'a represents the moral compass of a Muslim's personal and public life." (Esposito and Mogahed 2007) . Hefner describes shari'a as "a system of ethical injunctions as much as 'law' in modern sense." (Hefner 2011: 2) .
2 Values as predictors of attitudes have been extensively examined by the public opinion scholars in the West (Ingelhart and Welzel 2005; Feldman 2003; Schwartz 1992) . In the Muslim and the Arab world, however, the empirical analysis of attitudinal aspects of values is not widely utilized.
3 The construction of dichotomous variables is related to the model choice which is bivariate
probit. An alternative model could be bivarate ordered probit. However, this model requires more restrictive assumptions and, in some of the estimations, it does not converge.
4 I acknowledge that the contextual effects are certainly more nuanced. In this paper, I make a modest contribution and just show that a contextual variation may be in order. I prefer not to use these models due to the possible endogeneity problem in these specifications. 7 The results of these models can be found in author's website. Additional analyses are available upon request.
Appendix A: For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree (1) strongly, agree (2), disagree (4), or disagree strongly (5), DK (3).
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. A university education is more important for a boy than a girl. Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages 
